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ABSTRACT: Guaranteeing farm income stability is an objective of the European Union’s and the 
Spanish agricultural policies. In this paper, CAP direct payments, diversification, crop insurance and an 
Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) were compared considering (i) their effect on farm income and income 
stability, (ii) the expected farmers’ willingness for adoption, and (iii) the efficiency of public expenditure 
invested in supporting them. Main conclusions point at direct payments and crop diversification as the 
most effective measures in decreasing income variability. Nevertheless, using crop insurance or an IST 
has potential for both improving farm resilience to income variability and limiting public expenditure.
KEYWORDS: Crop insurance, direct payments, diversification, income stabilisation fund, income 
volatility.
Evaluación de herramientas de gestión del riego para la estabilización 
de la renta agraria en el marco de la PAC 2014-2020
RESUMEN: Garantizar la estabilidad de la renta agraria es uno de los objetivos de las políticas agrarias 
española y comunitaria. Se comparan los pagos directos, la diversificación, los seguros agrarios y un 
Instrumento de Estabilización de Rentas (IER) respecto a (i) su efecto en la renta agraria y su estabilidad, 
(ii) la predisposición de los productores a adoptarlos y (iii) la eficiencia del gasto público. Los pagos 
directos y la diversificación son las medidas más eficaces para estabilizar la renta. El seguro y el IER 
mejoran la estabilidad de la renta con una alta eficiencia del gasto público.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Diversificación, fondo de estabilización de rentas, pagos directos, seguro agrario, 
volatilidad de la renta.
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1. Introduction
Farm income is volatile due to fluctuating yields and input and output prices. 
Yield variability is mainly related to weather, and pests and diseases; while prices 
of the main commodities are set internationally based on global annual production, 
demand changes and stocks, and other market factors, all of them hardly affected by 
individual farmer decisions (Garrido et al., 2016).
 Guaranteeing stability and a fair standard of living to farmers are objectives of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), already established by the EC Treaty. CAP 
measures to reach such objectives have evolved to meet social demands towards a 
more environmentally respectful agriculture and restraining CAP spending, as well 
as to respond to external aspects as World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. 
CAP has shifted from supporting product prices to supporting producers, mainly 
through direct payments. Market instruments remain now as safety nets, ensuring 
that intervention prices are only used under real crisis scenarios, thus exposing far-
mers to significant variations of market prices.
For the eligible farmers, direct payments contribute to stability by ensuring a sta-
ble source of income, while other CAP measures reinforce farm income stabilisation, 
like crop diversification and risk management tools. Crop diversification is a requi-
rement for receiving the greening payment, which accounts to one third of the direct 
payment check. Besides enhancing environmental effects, crop diversification might 
reduce income fluctuation, compensating the possible worse performance of a crop 
with a better performance of another in the same year. The use of alternative mixed 
public-private risk management tools is helpful to buffer the negative effects of such 
fluctuations. Such products involve the co-responsibility of farmers, lower public 
expenditure, and when designed within certain limits, they are considered not to 
distort markets (Meuwissen et al., 2008). In other developed countries, like the U.S. 
and Canada, many insurance products and income stabilization tools are designed 
and offered to farmers, with significant public support. In Europe, well-developed 
agricultural insurance systems already exist, as it is the case of Spain (Bardají and 
Garrido, 2016). This alternative approach has been materialized after the last CAP 
reform supporting crop insurance, mutual funds and income stabilization tools (IST) 
through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).
However, the actual success of such measures will not only depend on their abi-
lity to stabilise farm income but also on the willingness of farmers to adopt them. 
Some of the measures do not entail an active participation of beneficiaries (uncon-
ditional fraction of the direct payments), though others require a decision of farmers 
either by participating financially (insurance, saving accounts or mutual fund) or by 
modifying the farming strategy (diversification). Hence, it is relevant to ask whether 
farmers would be willing to adopt instruments that are available now and others up-
coming in the next years.
Research about CAP’s recent and new risk management instruments has focused 
on the extent to which such tools can decrease income volatility (e.g. Enjolras et al., 
2014) or income inequalities between farms (e.g. Finger and El Benni, 2014; Mary 
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et al., 2013) or in comparisons with already implemented tools. Also, research on 
risk management tools demand has looked at aspects as public incentives through 
subsidies or the presence of adverse selection (e.g. Donoghue, 2014; Garrido and Zil-
berman, 2008a; Santeramo et al., 2016; Shaik et al., 2008). Farmers’ willingness to 
adopt such instruments, either by contracting them or by meeting cross-compliance 
to be beneficiaries, is relevant for policy-makers to design requirements and condi-
tions of these instruments. 
No evidence about the CAP 2014-2020 effects is yet available. This paper con-
tributes to estimate such effects by analysing the role of alternative risk management 
tools and strategies to stabilize agricultural income in extensive arable farms in Spain 
and the potential willingness of farmers to adopt them. The analysis is illustrated 
with a representative arable farm in the region of Castilla y León (northern central 
Spain), the only Spanish region which has proposed to support Income Stabilisation 
Tool (IST) within its Rural Development Programmes (2014-2020), and a new tool 
for risk management proposed within the Rural Development policy. The aims of the 
paper are to (i) quantify farm income and income stability offered by alternative risk 
management strategies provided at the European, national and private level, (ii) es-
timate the expected farmers’ willingness to adopt the available instruments, and (iii) 
evaluate the efficiency of public expenditure invested in subsidizing them.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the risk management instru-
ments evaluated in this work. Section 3 lays out the theoretical model and Section 4 
describes its practical implementation. Section 5 presents the results that are discus-
sed in Section 6. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the main findings. 
2. Risk management instruments
Bielza et al. (2009) classified risk management tools in two groups, either con-
cerning on-farm measures or risk sharing strategies. The first group involves on-farm 
resources changing the production strategy (diversification, input intensification, 
retention), the commercial strategy (vertical integration) or the use of farm benefits 
(stabilisation accounts). The second group involves third parties that assume part of 
the risk in return of a monetary reward (insurance or mutual funds). 
Four risk management measures were considered within this work: CAP direct 
payments, crop diversification, crop insurance and an income stabilisation tool, de-
signed as a mutual fund. Direct payments still play a great prominence in the global 
CAP budget. They contribute to ensuring the long term viability of farms by provi-
ding a basic fixed income support, and therefore making them less vulnerable to fluc-
tuations of income. Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 sets out general guidelines for di-
rect payments implementation, leaving a range of freedom to member states based on 
subsidiarity principle. Part of the direct payment is conditioned on the performance 
of farming practices enhancing the sustainable management of natural resources, the 
so-called, greening payment, being diversification one of the requisites. Diversifica-
tion, through the introduction of more than a single crop in the farm, also contributes 
to farm income stability reducing yield and price fluctuation. 
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Direct and decoupled payments scheme presumably incentivises farmers to orient 
farming decisions to markets. This enhances competitiveness, but in the current con-
text of increasing market and price liberalization, it also exposes farmers to market 
risks and crises. A number of risk management instruments are available to comple-
ment farmers’ coping capacity with large income losses.
Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 on support for rural development by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) considers in its article 36 the 
possibility of supporting the premium of crop, animal, and plant insurance, mutual 
funds for adverse climatic events, animal and plant diseases, pest infestations and 
environmental incidents and income stabilisation tools (IST). However, a number of 
EU countries already implement similar instruments supporting them through State 
aids, as it is the case of agricultural insurance in Spain. Using State aids comprises 
the advantages of being less restrictive in terms of loss coverage and subsidies, as 
they might be within the amber box in the WTO agriculture agreement. 
Crop insurance is contracted by farmers to protect themselves against yield losses 
due to natural hazards such as hail, fire, crop damage caused by wild fauna, flood and 
excessive rainfall and other adversities impeding crop emergence or limiting crop 
growth (including drought). Multi-peril insurance for arable crops (including cereal, 
oilseed and protein crops) has been operating in Spain since 1982. It includes a num-
ber of insurance modules that differ based on the coverage, on individual fields or the 
whole farm, rainfed or irrigated, in the way indemnities are calculated when a loss 
occurs, and on the maximum insurable yield guaranteed. 
Crop insurance premiums are proportional to insured yields, vary depending on 
the contracted module and deductible, and are subsidized by the national and regional 
governments. Updated maximum insurable yield per municipality is published every 
year in the Spanish Official Gazette (BOE). For farmers that have contracted the insu-
rance in previous years, maximum insurable yield is based on his/her claims history.
IST works as a mutual fund protecting against low incomes. Regulation (EU) No 
1305/2013 states in its article 39 that support to IST is allowed to contribute to up to 
65 % of the corresponding indemnity to farmers. Such allowance is only permitted 
when the IST compensates only a drop of income exceeding 30 % of the average 
annual income of the individual farmer in the preceding three-year period (or a 
three-year average based on the preceding five-year period excluding the highest 
and lowest entry and payments), to fit with WTO regulations for being considered 
a green box measure of support. Additionally, such compensation shall compensate 
no more than 70 % of the lost income in the year the producer becomes eligible to 
receive this assistance.
Article 39 in Regulation 1305/2013 specifies that income, for the purposes IST, 
shall refer to the sum of revenues the farmer receives from the market, including any 
form of public support, deducting input cost, therefore, to gross margin. Therefore, 
the IST was defined as follows. Each year, before the growing season, the farmer 
pays a premium to the mutual fund of the IST. After harvest selling, if income is 
lower than the 70 % of the average income received by the farmer in the preceding 
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five-year period, excluding the highest and lowest entry, the farmer is correspond-
ingly indemnified. 
3. Theoretical framework
Producers are expected to design their farming strategy based on the expected 
utility of different alternatives. Farm income and income stability are core variables 
driving the utility of a certain outcome. 
Farm income (excluding fixed costs) results from deducing farming variable costs:
[1]
where  is the expected farm income available for the farmer in the year t, xi is 
the proportion of the crop i in the rotation (takes the value 1 when monoculture) and 
Ci are the direct costs associated to crop i. Average income was calculated assuming 
that farm strategy, either monoculture or crop rotation, does not change in time. 
 is the expected farm revenue in the year t, and it was calculated as follows:
[2]
where  and  are the price and yield of crop i in year t,  are the results of the 
protection tools in year t, including premiums and indemnities, and CAP is the direct 
payment received by the farmer. Three possibilities of CAP direct payments were 
considered depending on whether or not the farmer would be a beneficiary, and if so 
meeting or not meeting greening requirements. 
Both xi and Ci are assumed to be constant per crop. On the contrary, crop prices 
and yields vary from year to year as a consequence of climate variability and extreme 
events, and consequently,  varies as well.  is calculated differently depending on 
the protection option (with  = 0, when no protection tool is used).  is calculated 
based on the protection tool, crop insurance or IST (Eq 3 and 4, respectively). 
Contracting crop insurance implies paying a premium (PCI) every year before 
sowing. Assuming farmer has been contracting insurance for years, insured yields 
(Yins,i) should be close to average observed yields. Insured yield was set at the ave-
rage yield of the farmer in the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and 
lowest entries. For arable crops insurance, farmers have the option of increasing the 
insured yield at midseason with a complementary insurance payment if yield expec-
tation exceeds that insured before sowing. In this work, for the sake of simplicity, this 
option was not modelled. Indemnities are received when actual yield falls below a 
certain proportion of the insured yield, a franchise (M):
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[3]
where Yins,i is the insured yield of crop i.
Contracting the IST also implies paying a premium (PIST) every year before 
sowing. Indemnities are received when actual income falls below a certain proportion 
of the average income, a franchise (M):
[4]
where  is the average income in the last 5 years.
Therefore, both crop insurance and IST have a cost to the farmer (premium) and 
possible revenues (indemnities). IST and crop insurances premiums are paid inde-
pendently from farm performance.
4. Empirical application
Two farm strategies scenarios were evaluated: a wheat monoculture (Triticum 
aestivum L.) and a crop rotation meeting CAP greening requirements including 40 % 
wheat, 40 % barley (Hordeum vulgare L.) and 20 % dry beans (Pisum sativum L.).
Data on mean yields and market prices in Valladolid province (Castilla y León) 
between 1993 and 2015 are publicly available at the regional government website 
(JCyL, 2014) (Figures 1 and 2). Wheat prices, following the same pattern of inter-
national commodity prices, have experienced an increase and a high volatility from 
2007 (FAO, 2011). Average costs were calculated per crop based on surveyed farms 
between 2010 and 2013 in Valladolid province by ECREA resulting in 267, 237 and 
105 € ha–1 for wheat, barley and dry peas respectively (MAGRAMA, 2015). 
Yield and prices were modelled with the software package @-Risk (Palisade 
Corporation, 2011) fitting data to the probability distribution functions with the lower 
value of the statistic chi-square. Asymmetric density functions non bounded on the 
right and truncated at zero in the left were selected, as used by many authors (Bielza 
et al., 2004). 
Crop yields were modelled using 23 yearly observations (1993-2015). Wheat 
and dry peas were fitted to beta distributions and barley to a gamma. Several authors 
point at the significant decrease in yield variability when the aggregation scale of the 
data used in the analysis increases (Finger, 2012; Górski and Górska, 2003; Lobell 
et al., 2007; Marra and Schurle, 1994; Rudstrom et al., 2002). Marra and Schurle 
(1994) concluded that standard deviation of yields should be corrected on about 
0.1 % for each 1 % of difference between the mean areas of the scales considered. 
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The average wheat area per farm in the study region is 58.9 ha(INE, 2014), and the 
agricultural rainfed area of the province, 495,000 ha (JCyL, 2014). Using Marra and 
Schurle (1994) approximation, a rough estimation for a conversion factor to trans-
form province-level to farm-level risks results in 10 % increase in yield standard 
deviation from province to farm, that was applied to the crop yield distribution 
functions. Additionally, a probability of extreme event damage as hail or fire was 
considered and set at 4.6 % (Agroseguro, personal communication). Crop yields were 
found to be correlated at 0.94 for wheat-barley, 0.63 for wheat-peas and 0.65 for 
barley-peas. Such correlations were considered in the simulation model.
 
FIGURE 1 
Wheat, barley and dry peas average yield (tonnes ha‒1) in Valladolid province 
between 1993 and 2015
Source: JCyL (2014).
Lognormal distributions were used for prices, as in Bielza et al. (2004) following 
Goodwin et al. (2000). With the aim to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the con-
sidered risk management alternatives, and based on the sharply differentiated periods 
of price volatility, crop prices were modelled for two scenarios. The first scenario 
included data in the period 1993 to 2006 characterised by low and stable prices (Low 
and stable scenario). Data from 2007 to 2015, characterized by high and volatile pri-
ces, was used in the second scenario (High and volatile scenario) (Figure 3).
The franchise for crop insurance and the IST was 30 %, therefore farmers are 
indemnified only when the drop of yields and income exceeds a 30 % of the ave-
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rage yield and income, respectively. Indemnities compensate for 70 % of the yield 
or income lost in the year the farmer becomes eligible to receive this assistance, for 
the crop insurance and the IST respectively. The average value of the basic CAP 
payments rights was set at 90.92 € ha-1 (value for 2019) for direct payment bene-
ficiaries and an increase in 51.7 % when meeting greening requirements, therefore 
137.93 € ha-1 (FEGA, 2016).
FIGURE 2 
Wheat, barley and dry peas average price (€ tonne‒1) in Valladolid province 
between 1993 and 2015
Source: JCyL (2014).
Crop insurance and IST premiums were calculated as the expected value of the 
indemnities using 2000 simulated yields and prices. Insurer’s loading and commis-
sions were assumed to be 20 % of the premium. The same loading was charged to 
the IST mutual fund as a safety measure for assuring the fund capacity to overcome 
crisis. Crop insurance premium is independent from prices and, therefore, it did not 
change in the two scenarios, it was calculated at 31.4 € ha–1 for wheat monoculture 
and at 26.1 € ha–1 for crop rotation. A 65 % of the insurance premium is defrayed by 
the State. On the contrary, as IST indemnities depend on income, besides crop yields, 
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IST premium also depends on crop prices and CAP direct payments. IST premium is 
not calculated over the accumulated indemnities, but on the 35 %, as the remainder is 
defrayed by the European Commission. Calculated premiums are shown in Figure 4.
Each of the combined alternatives (direct payments, diversification and protection 
tools) was evaluated for the two prices scenarios, using 2000 yield and prices simula-
tions were analysed in 200 ten-year periods. 
FIGURE 3 
Wheat, barley and peas price distributions in the low and stable prices scenario 
(L-S, representing the period 1993-2006) and the high and volatile prices 
scenario (H-V, representing the period 2007-2015)
Source: Own elaboration based on JCyL (2014).
Farmers’ evaluation for alternative farming strategies and risk protection tools 
were assessed by means of farmer’s certainty equivalent. Farmers’ certainty equi-
valents were calculated following Bielza et al. (2007), assuming to be directly pro-
portional to expected income and inversely proportional to CV. Risk aversion was 
assumed to be constant independently from farmers’ profitability, therefore using 
Constant Risk Aversion Coefficients (CARA). 
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FIGURE 4
(A) Crop insurance premium (€ ha–1) , total and state contribution, 
and (B) IST premium (€ ha–1) for the beneficiaries and no beneficiaries 
of CAP direct payments, meeting and not meeting greening requirements, 
practising monoculture or a rotation and for the low and stable prices 
and high and volatile prices scenarios
Source: Own elaboration based on JCyL (2014).
Two CARA were used, a value of 0.3 to represent a lower risk averse and 0.6 for 
a higher risk averse farmers.
[6]
where  is the expected income, γ is the CARA coefficient and  the 
coefficient of variation of the expected income. 
Farm economic performance included farmers’ profitability in the short term, ex-
pected annual income calculated as the mean of the simulated incomes, low incomes 
(percentile 5 of annual incomes) and variability (annual income standard deviation 
and coefficient of variation, CV). 
Additionally, the analysis was completed with an assessment of the increase 
of the expected and low incomes and certainty equivalent, and the decrease of the 
coefficient of variation for each alternative with respect to a reference per euro inves-
ted by the European Union or the State through subsidies. Such a reference was set as 
the alternative of no CAP payments, wheat monoculture and no protection tool con-
tracted by the farmer. Each variable was calculated for each ten-year period; results 
are the mean of the 200 simulations. 
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5. Results 
Results are presented as the main statistics of farm income, certainty equivalents 
and public cost efficiency. They refer to farmer’s profitability (expected annual in-
come), low incomes (percentile 5 of annual incomes) and variability (annual income 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation), all this reported in Table 1. Farmer’s 
willingness to adopt these measures is evaluated based on the certainty equivalents 
for two levels of farmer risk aversion (Table 2). Lastly, public cost (PC, € ha–1) and 
the efficiency of public support for each alternative are shown in Table 3 in terms of 
expected and low incomes, coefficient of variation and certainty equivalent for high 
risk averse farmers (CE0.6).
Direct payments were the most effective measure in increasing farm expected and 
lower incomes. Farms receiving direct payments were significantly more profitable 
when meeting greening requirements (Table 1) as also receiving greening payment. 
The probability of having a negative income decreases for higher direct payments 
scenario, for crop rotation and when opting for a protection tool (either crop insu-
rance or the IST) (Table 1).
Contracting protection tools (either crop insurance or the IST) was less effective 
in increasing farm expected and lower incomes than direct payments. This is due to 
the annual crop insurance and IST premium cost (Table 1). Regarding the protection 
tools, the IST was always more effective than crop insurance in terms of increasing 
farmer’s profitability (expected annual income) (Table 1). 
Income variability was evaluated in absolute terms (standard deviation) or with 
respect to the mean income (CV). Direct payments were the most effective measure in 
decreasing annual income variability, followed by diversification. Results show that 
the decrease in income variability is caused particularly by a reduction of the left tail 
of income’s distribution, while differences in the expected incomes are much lower 
(Table 1). Regarding protection options, the IST was more effective than crop insu-
rance in increasing farm lower incomes and decreasing income variability (Table 1). 
Direct payments are expected to be the measure that most satisfies farmers. Re-
garding protection tools, the IST is expected to be the preferred (Table 2).
Direct payments, crop insurance and IST involve public expenditure. Direct pay-
ments were clearly the most expensive (Table 3). A more interesting analysis arises 
from evaluating public expenditure of the instruments not in absolute terms but rela-
tive to the fulfilment of their objectives, thus increasing expected and low incomes, 
decreasing income variability and increasing farmer’s willingness to adopt certain 
strategies, as shown in Table 3. Higher public expenditure efficiency was found for 
subsidizing protection tools than for direct payments, especially for increasing low 
incomes and decreasing variability per € of public expenditure. Regarding protection 
tools, higher public expenditure efficiency was found for subsidized IST than for 
crop insurance but for the most risky case, that is, for no CAP beneficiaries, prac-
tising monoculture in the High and Volatile prices scenario. Efficiency was always 
higher for farms diversifying (Table 3).
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TABLE 1
Expected income1, percentile 5 of incomes (p5) and income standard deviation 
(St dev, € ha-1) and coefficient of variation, (CV, –) for the beneficiaries 
and no beneficiaries of CAP direct payments, meeting and not meeting 
greening requirements, practising monoculture or a rotation and using crop 
insurance, an income stabilization tool (IST) or no protection option for two 
prices scenarios (low and stable and high and volatile)
Scenario LOW 
and STABLE
Scenario HIGH 
and VOLATILE
Direct 
payments Strategy
Protection 
option Exp
3 p5 St dev CV Exp p5
St 
dev CV
None 
Monoculture
None 94 -110 134 2.22 231 -54 199 1.17
Crop insurance 102 -39 106 1.19 247 43 163 0.71
IST 127 39 75 0.58 265 123 130 0.50
Rotation
None 84 -56 102 1.54 202 0 155 0.81
Crop insurance 90 -18 86 1.03 215 51 136 0.65
IST 117 44 67 0.60 238 118 115 0.49
Basic 
Monoculture
None 185 -19 134 1.96 322 37 199 0.65
Crop insurance 193 52 106 0.59 337 134 163 0.49
IST 213 115 83 0.40 353 199 138 0.39
Rotation
None 175 35 102 0.60 293 91 155 0.54
Crop insurance 181 73 86 0.48 306 142 136 0.45
IST 199 115 75 0.38 321 190 123 0.38
Basic + 
Greening
Monoculture2
None 232 28 134 0.62 369 84 199 0.56
Crop insurance 240 99 106 0.46 384 181 163 0.43
IST 255 151 87 0.35 395 235 142 0.36
Rotation
None 222 82 102 0.47 340 138 155 0.46
Crop insurance 228 120 86 0.38 353 189 136 0.39
IST 241 151 79 0.33 364 227 126 0.35
1 Income refers to gross margin, as it only includes variable costs.
2 Only if farm area is lower than 30 ha.
3 Exp: Expected income.
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TABLE 2
Certainty equivalent (CE, € ha-1) for two coefficients of absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) for the beneficiaries and no beneficiaries of CAP direct payments, 
meeting and not meeting greening requirements, practising monoculture 
or a rotation and using crop insurance, an income stabilization tool (IST) 
or no protection option for two prices scenarios (low and stable and high 
and volatile)
Scenario LOW 
and STABLE
Scenario HIGH 
and VOLATILE
Direct 
payments Strategy Protection option CE
20.3 CE0.6 CE0.3 CE0.6 
None 
Monoculture
None 54 13 171 112
Crop insurance 70 38 198 149
IST 104 82 226 187
Rotation
None 54 23 156 109
Crop insurance 65 39 174 133
IST 97 77 203 169
Basic 
Monoculture
None 145 104 262 202
Crop insurance 161 129 289 240
IST 188 163 311 270
Rotation
None 145 114 247 200
Crop insurance 156 130 265 224
IST 176 154 284 248
Basic + 
Greening
Monoculture1
None 192 151 309 249
Crop insurance 208 176 336 287
IST 229 203 353 310
Rotation
None 192 161 294 247
Crop insurance 203 177 312 271
IST 218 194 326 288
1 Only if farm area is lower than 30 ha.
2 Certainty equivalent for a Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion of 0.3 (CE0.3) and 0.6 (CE0.6).
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Public expenditure was efficient as well in potentially increasing farmer’s 
willingness to contract crop insurance and IST, especially when farmers were not 
CAP beneficiaries and for more risk-averse farmers (Table 3). 
Farmer’s profitability and low income were higher in the high and volatile pri-
ces scenario. For this scenario, the income standard deviation was higher but the 
coefficient of variation was lower than for the low and stable prices scenario. The 
efficiency of protection tools in decreasing income variability was higher in the low 
and stable prices scenario (between 12 and 85 %) than in the high and volatile prices 
scenario (between 39 and 70 %). Higher decreases were found for the riskier alterna-
tives, that is, no CAP beneficiaries practicing monoculture (Figure 5).
FIGURE 5
Decrease in the income coefficient of variation (%) with respect to a reference 
(No CAP, monoculture and no protection tool) for the beneficiaries 
and no beneficiaries of CAP direct payments, meeting and not meeting 
greening requirements, practising monoculture or a rotation and using crop 
insurance, the Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) or no protection option for (A) 
the low and stable prices and (B) high and volatile prices scenarios
Source: Own elaboration based on simulation results.
6. Discussion
Direct payments were the most effective measure in terms of increasing farms 
expected and lower incomes. This is in agreement with conclusions drawn about the 
income effects of direct support in the post 2003 scheme, as the one performed by 
Agrosynergie (2011). Such evaluation was performed at regional scale for the EU-27 
covering macroeconomics, based on regional data, and microeconomics, on indivi-
dual farm data for seven types of farming, economic farm size, farm location and 
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types of farm organization. Agrosynergie (2011) concludes that decoupled payments 
provide a positive and robust contribution to increasing and stabilizing income. 
Farms receiving direct payments were significantly more profitable when meeting 
greening requirements. Therefore, direct payments also have a clear effect of lowe-
ring farm risk, even when such measure is not directly intended to support farm risk 
management (as it increases farm expected income), shortening the left-tail of the 
income distribution; in the case of the CAP 2014-2020, also indirectly promoting the 
adoption of risk management measures, namely crop diversification, to meet gree-
ning requirements. 
Crop diversification is a requirement for being eligible to greening payments. It 
does not require any direct public support but affords a significant decrease in in-
come variability. Morales et al. (2008) found farm diversification to be a clear substi-
tute to insurance and futures and option markets, being diversified farmers those with 
a lesser need to contract such risk sharing tools. Similarly, Santeramo et al. (2016) 
found insurance demand to be negatively correlated with crop diversification, and 
concluded that it constitutes itself a form of insurance. Similar conclusions are drawn 
in this work, where farms diversifying had lower income variability, therefore ha-
ving a lower need to contract protection tools. Aside of contributing to farm income 
stability reducing yield and price fluctuation, greening could be expected to decrease 
income as it might imply a higher marginal cost per crop included in the rotation as 
far as specialization decreases. However, in the particular case, greening resulted in a 
higher income due to the high prices of dry peas and the fact that fixed and not varia-
ble costs were considered.
Greening could be seen as decreasing farmer’s utility as it is actually imposed by 
the CAP, and not voluntarily done by farmers. This could bring them to cast doubts 
on the foundation to calculate the Certainty Equivalent. Yet, Certainty Equivalent in 
this paper might be seen as providing meaningful results when considering a purely 
rational behaviour of farmers and the favourable economic results of the rotation 
strategy of this case study.
Contracting protection tools contributed significantly to decreasing income’s 
coefficient of variation. This result is in agreement with previous studies on the 
potential effects of income stabilization tools on income stability in the sense that it 
contributes to decreasing income variability (Finger and El Benni, 2014; Mary et al., 
2013). Mary et al. (2013) evaluated the potential implementation of the IST introdu-
ced by the CAP 2014-2020 using a farm household model calibrated to French cereal 
farms and found a high efficiency of the tool, being the decrease in income coeffi-
cient of variation of more than 35 %. In this work, decreases in income coefficient of 
variation when using the IST were between 73 and 85 % in the low and stable prices 
scenario and between 57 and 70 % in the high and volatile prices scenario (Figure 5). 
The higher effectiveness in increasing farm income stability of the IST with respect 
to crop insurance is due to the direct protection offered by IST against low incomes. 
Instead, crop insurance only protects against yield losses.
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Individual decisions on farm strategies as practicing crop rotation or contracting 
risk management tools are complementary to CAP direct payments for achieving 
the CAP objectives of stabilizing farmers’ income. This suggests that incentives to 
contracting protection tools as in the rural development regulation of the CAP reform 
2014-2020 are a good compromise for both improving farm resilience to yield and 
price variability and restraining public expenditure. Likewise, sharing risk manage-
ment responsibility with farmers, and conditioning aids to the performance of risk re-
ducing measures (as diversification, crop insurance or an IST), even when supporting 
such measures (crop insurance premiums and IST indemnities), are essential to deve-
lop responsibility and involvement of farmers and other stakeholders (Cordier, 2014).
Public support measures, and the corresponding expenditure, might behave as 
compensations or as incentives. In the first case, public measures as direct payments 
aim at compensating market failures or at protecting strategic activities with difficul-
ties to survive due to high opportunity costs or to competitive disadvantages. In the 
second case, measures aim at incentivizing the adoption of certain practices, thereby 
driving agricultural activity towards the objective stated in a particular policy. Sub-
sidies to protection tools (either for crop insurance premiums or to IST indemnities) 
and cross-compliance of direct payments are under this category. The success of CAP 
measures towards reducing farm income risk will be related to the level of adoption 
of such practices. It is then relevant to question whether farmers are willing to adopt 
protection tools or not, which is to say whether public expenditure actually incentivi-
zes farmers to adopt the available risk management strategies. The certainty equiva-
lent is an indicator of the expected willingness of the farmers to adopt the proposed 
tools, and therefore, the increase in certainty equivalent per public euro invested in 
subsidizing such tools might be interpreted as the efficiency of public expenditure in 
incentivizing such behaviour in farmers. 
Cereal insurance in Spain has a relatively high penetration rate, reaching 63.9 % 
in 2015 (Machetti Bermejo, 2015). This supports the results suggesting that crop 
insurance always resulted in higher certainty equivalent than not contracting any pro-
tection system, especially for more risk averse farmers. As it has not yet implemen-
ted in this region, no observed data is available to contrast the results obtained for 
IST. However, results suggest that farmers might be expected to be more willing to 
contract IST than not contracting any protection tool and even than contracting crop 
insurance. Therefore, the implementation of IST schemes could derive in a decrease 
in insurance demand.
The robustness of these protection systems is highly dependent on the accuracy 
with which the insurer quantifies the actual yield and overall risk, and additionally 
the actual annual costs, in the case of the IST. However, records on individual actual 
yields and input costs are solely available to the farmer, resulting in an important 
source of information asymmetries (moral hazard and adverse selection). A number 
of methodologies for yield and costs estimation is being developed and implemented 
in order to avoid moral hazard in crop, revenue and income insurances. That is the 
case of indexes and crop models for yield assessment (Castañeda-Vera et al., 2015; 
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Escribano Rodríguez et al., 2014) or scoring grids fixed by experts for costs estima-
tion (Bardají and Garrido, 2016).
Contrary to the view of direct payments as behaving as risk preventive measures, 
some authors suggest a possible negative effect of farm vulnerability, becoming 
sometimes in risk-enhancing tools or even promoting moral hazard. El Benni et al. 
(2012) suggests that Swiss agricultural policy evolution from market-based support 
to direct payments has decreased farm income variability, behaving direct payments 
as insurance for farmers making them more willing to take risk from crop production. 
A similar result was found by Enjolras et al. (2014) for French farmers. This might 
question the efficiency of such structural policies regarding risk management. 
A differential effect of CAP measures might be expected in different farm types 
and location. Conclusions of this work are therefore valid for the area and farming 
strategies considered, but might change for other regions with different climate (yield 
variability) and cultivated crops. A wider study performing a similar analysis at a 
national and regional scale, including common crops and farm strategies and using 
historical or simulated data for yields and prices, would be useful to evaluate the 
equilibrium of the efficiency of horizontal measures such as those considered within 
the CAP 2014-2020 in different European countries and regions.
7. Conclusions
Direct payments were the most effective measure in increasing farm expected and 
lower incomes and income stability, especially when meeting greening requirements. 
Crop diversification does not require any direct public support but provides itself a 
significant decrease in income variability. 
The IST was found to be highly efficient in decreasing the income coefficient of 
variation especially in the scenario where prices were lower and more stable and for 
the riskier alternatives (no CAP beneficiary and practising monoculture); thus for no 
CAP beneficiaries practicing monoculture. The effectiveness in increasing certainty 
equivalent was higher for the IST than for crop insurance. Therefore, the implemen-
tation of IST schemes could result in a decrease in insurance demand, as the instru-
ments are substitutes.
Subsidized protection tools are a good compromise for both improving farm resi-
lience to yield and price variability and to restrain public expenditure as they achieve 
high level of income stability to a much lower cost than subsidizing direct payments. 
The relative efficiency between risk management instruments remained unchan-
ged in both prices scenarios, suggesting the validity of the conclusions of this paper 
even under the great uncertainty of rapidly changing economic and climatic envi-
ronment that characterized agricultural sector performance in the last decade. This 
makes recommendable to put risk management tools on the spotlight giving them a 
greater prominence in the future CAP design.
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